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•  Flexibility in international joint ventures (JVS) is important and a shared but split 
control style is recommended. 
•  Chinese partners used to have learning as their main objective in an IJV but this 
has been replaced by profit, growth and market share.
•  The most significant shifts in control between partners involve human resource 
management and research and development.
•  When foreign partners insist on adherence to their own management philosophy, 
culture clashes occur.
•  Negotiation is a part of daily life in the IJVs, and it occurs at both executive and 
managerial levels, depending upon the significance of the item.1  |  Management controls in automotive international joint ventures involving Chinese parent companies
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Overview and objectives
This project investigated the management controls exerted by 
overseas and local parents in four automotive international joint 
ventures (IJVs) in China. A shared but split management style 
was identified, which supplements the previous studies on IJVs 
management. The study also found evidence on the dynamics of 
management controls and the drivers behind change.  
Over time, IJVs have become common in a wide range of 
industries due to rapid technological changes and increased 
emphasis on globalisation strategies. The emergence of China 
as the ’factory to the world’ and its rapidly growing domestic 
market are attractive to investors. For example, in 2009 China 
sold 13.5 million vehicles and became the largest car market 
overtaking the United States who sold 10.4 million in 2009. 
Established ‘old world’ firms cannot ignore these markets if they 
want to maintain pre-eminence in mass markets. 
Cultural pressures, government imposed controls and the costs 
of setting up new operations and far away markets mean that 
partnerships with local firms are often the most sensible, or 
only form of business development. This often occurs if the 
overseas firm wants to be an integral part of the local economy 
and not simply an importer. Consequently, China has become 
the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment today, 
and IJVs between overseas and Chinese companies become 
one of the predominant modes of entry into China. From 1982 
to 2004, China experienced an average annual growth rate of 
24% in foreign investment and almost 32% in equity IJVs. In 
the automotive industry, IJV is the only available mode because 
the Chinese government does not allow wholly foreign owned 
enterprises and requires that Chinese partners hold at least 50% 
equity in IJVs. 
While there are more opportunities for multi-national 
enterprises to realise their objectives in China, the control of 
IJVs is very challenging. Previous studies suggest difficulties in 
managing IJVs involving Chinese partners and management 
controls have been identified as one of the factors that influence 
the performance of IJVs (e.g. Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Chalos 
and O’Connor, 2005). In order to effectively exert management 
controls, it is important to understand how such controls have 
been applied in practice.
This study adopts a bargaining power model to examine what 
and how management controls have been exerted by overseas 
and local parents, and how these have been shaped by the 
relative bargaining power of parents. The bargaining power 
model has been used to explain how a parent can use its 
resources and capabilities to gain control of its IJV to ensure 
the best possible return from the investment on the IJV. It also 
explains how to protect its strategic resources – like intellectual 
property – against industrial espionage (Yan and Gray, 1994). 
The previous studies of applying this model focus on the IJV 
formation stage and take the perspective that management 
controls are affected and determined at an IJV formation stage. 
We know little about how managers from different parents co-
operate and compete simultaneously in the control process. 
Aiming to close some of the above research gaps, the present 
study conducted four case studies and attempted to address the 
following two research questions:
1.  What management control mechanisms have been exerted 
in the case companies, and how? 
2.  How do management controls evolve and what are the 
drivers behind change?
Findings 
The general background of these companies can be outlined as 
below:
•  All are automotive IJVs in China, involving one European; one 
Japanese; and one Korean overseas company.
•  The Chinese companies involved are state-owned and located 
in four different regions.
•  All have 50/50 shareholdings between overseas and local 
partners.
•  All could be regarded as successful, based on two criteria: 
  − certain operation periods (six to eight years) and survival 
to date.
  − reported executive satisfaction with the achievement of 
objectives.
The control mechanisms adopted by both parents 
There are a variety of control mechanisms a partner may 
adopt in the control of its IJV. From our observation, the main 
mechanisms used by the overseas partners are:
•  staffing
•  adopting similar production and management systems
•  mentoring and training. 
Those used by the local partners are:
•  staffing
•  budgeting.
Although the overseas partners participated in budgeting, they 
used it mainly as a tool for planning, rather than as a control 
mechanism. 2  |  Management controls in automotive international joint ventures involving Chinese parent companies
Shared but split control style
The study identified the control model of the IJVs as ‘shared, but 
split1’, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Control access to the entire range of activities: share 
control
Based on 50/50 shareholdings, the overseas and local partners 
hold the same seats on the board of directors. All decisions in 
the case companies are made by consensus and no partner can 
be outvoted. This governance structure allows both parents to 
share control over the entire range of activities. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies on the control 
focus from overseas partners, but inconsistent with the local 
side. The Chinese partners used to focus their control only on 
specific areas and did not have motivation for overall control, as 
identified by prior studies. In our case companies, the Chinese 
partners have shown strong desire for overall control and have 
actually obtained the control access to the entire range of 
activities. From our observation, this change might be the result 
of their shifted objectives. Chinese companies used to have 
learning as their main objective in IJVs, but our case studies 
show their three most important objectives to be profit, growth 
and market share. 
Tight control over specific areas: split control 
A partner’s control can be regarded as tight when there exists 
a high degree of certainty that decisions will be made as that 
partner wishes. While the overseas and local parents have the 
same control access to the entire range of activities, it does not 
mean that they have the equal control tightness in all areas. 
Partner control tightness in particular areas is linked to their 
resource contributions, as observed from the case studies.
The resources contributed by both parents – apart from financial 
investment – are not even. From our investigation, the most 
important resources contributed by the overseas parents are:
•  manufacturing techniques 
•  operation management systems
•  supplier networks
•  distribution of products
•  product brands.
Contributions of the local parents are:
•  local market knowledge 
•  government resource input and policy support
•  expertise in local human resources management .
1  Previous studies on the control of IJVs identified four control styles as ‘shared, dominant, independent, and split’. For detailed explanation of these styles, 
refer to Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Killing, 1983.
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A shared control style allows both parents to exert overall 
control, however the same extent of control tightness across 
all areas from two parents might result in inefficiency and 
increased managerial difficulty. Rationally, both parents choose 
‘shared but split control’ – they only exert tight control over 
the areas in which they possess technology and knowledge. In 
the case study companies, the overseas partners exert tighter 
control over introducing new products, procurement, cost 
management and quality control. The local partners exerted 
tighter control over the areas of human resource management, 
government relationship, and they share a balanced control over 
manufacturing planning, pricing, and budgeting, as shown in 
Figure 1.
Benefits of adopting a shared but split control model
While the importance of local markets and government policies 
in certain industries award local companies with greater 
bargaining power, shared management would increasingly be 
preferred by local parents. This is contrary to the findings of 
previous studies. Overseas company dominant management 
might also be undesirable for foreign parents because it 
potentially hampers IJVs benefiting from the knowledge and 
management expertise of local parents. A ‘shared but split’ 
management style reflects the strategic positions of both 
parents, provides them with control access to the entire range 
of activities, and offers them the opportunities to play out their 
strengths that are important for the success of an IJV. 
The dynamics 
Although there is no evidence of significant changes in the 
corporate governance structure in the case companies, the 
study found that control tightness in some areas has shifted 
between the partners during the operation of the IJVs. The 
most significant changes are in the areas of human resource 
management (HRM) and research and development (R&D).
Increased control tightness on HRM from the local 
parents
Because of their strength in technology and management, 
the overseas partners initially pursued tight control in all 
areas, including HRM. This caused various problems in the 
management of those IJVs. For example, a Japanese IJV did not 
apply punishment to workers at the beginning of its operation 
based on its culture of loyalty through ’life-long employment’. 
This did not prove a good fit with the Chinese culture, and 
this IJV has changed to a policy of combining appraisal and 
punishment, which is commonly applied in local companies. 
Similar changes occurred in all the case companies, although to 
a differing extent.  
Increased local parent influence on design and 
marketing of new products 
When overseas parents insist on adhering to their own 
management philosophy, they encounter a culture clash. For 
example, an overseas parent was not completely satisfied with 
their performance in the Chinese market in terms of market 
share. They identified the main reason as their marketing 
strategy not fitting well into the Chinese culture. ‘We should put 
more efforts on understanding China, understanding how local 
people think,’ reflects an overseas Financial Manager in this IJV. 
As a consequence of this reflection, this IJV established an R&D 
department in 2008. 
The two IJVs we studied recently established their R&D 
departments, and a third has announced a plan to establish 
a joint R&D institute in late 2011. Overall, the opinions of 
local parents and managers on introducing new models are 
taken more seriously, and decisions are made more locally, as 
evidenced in all case IJVs. 
In general, we observed increased influence from the 
local partners over the areas of introducing new products, 
manufacturing planning, pricing, quality control, budgeting, and 
their dominant control over HRM in all case IJVs, as shown in 
Figure 1. The extent of these changes varied across the firms. 
The acceptance of the shifted control tightness from both 
overseas and local parents provides empirical evidence that 
IJVs need to reconfigure over time in response to changes in 
the partners’ relative bargaining power to ensure stability and 
overall performance (e.g. Yan & Gray, 1992). The shared and split 
control style fitted well with this dynamic environment.
The factors promoting the changes
The drivers behind the control dynamics are identified as below:
•  The acknowledgement of cultural differences from the 
overseas companies.
•  The increased importance of the Chinese market in the 
globalised world.
•  The influence of local government, as further discussed below. 
The role of local government 
Because of the economic significance of the automotive 
industry and that local partners were state-owned, local 
government plays a significant role in China at the IJV formation 
and operation stages. The present study reveals that while the 
involvement of local government brings vital resources and 
support to an IJV, it also adds uncertainty. This is one of the 
factors contributing to the control dynamics. 
Our study identified the following ways in which local 4  |  Management controls in automotive international joint ventures involving Chinese parent companies
government affects IJVs.  
•  At the formation stage, the resources and support provided 
by local government are an important consideration for the 
overseas partners, as observed in all case companies. 
•  Local government’s political needs may affect management 
control at the formation and operation stage.
  − Overseas partners may win favourable deals by taking 
advantage of the urgent political needs of a local 
government. Such needs may include having more IJVs in 
a certain area, improving the performance of state-owned 
firms, and rapidly increasing industry size. 
  − Overseas partners may have to compromise later. For 
example, local government may add extra conditions to 
an approval request relating to certain activities during 
the operation of an IJV. An important motivator for one 
of the case companies to set up an R&D department was 
a precondition the local government set when the IJV 
requested its approval for building a new factory. 
Bargaining in control process 
Bargaining during the operation process is observed in all four 
case companies, although the level of intensity differs. This 
brings the elements of support and challenge from two parents 
into the relationship between the managers. ’We are in the 
meetings most of the time’ – all managers we interviewed made 
this comment on their experience. Furthermore, they ranked the 
improved negotiating ability as their most important work-
based learning outcome. 
The case studies reveal both partners take profit, growth and 
market share as their most important objectives. However, 
they prioritise differently, especially in the first few years – the 
overseas partners’ primary objective is local market share, while 
the Chinese partners do not want to sacrifice profit for growth. 
This gap is caused largely by the un-equal number of profit 
sources from and un-even control over the profitability of IJVs 
between partners. 
First, the profit pool available to the overseas partner of an IJV 
may be larger than the IJV itself. For a local partner, distributed 
profit is the main financial income from its IJV. In comparison, 
overseas partners have many other ways to benefit financially 
from the IJVs because of their contribution of technology and 
supplier networks. These profit sources include equipment sales, 
technology transfer fees, related transactions with suppliers, and 
other inter-organisational transactions. In one case company, the 
local managers once analysed and identified 18-20 sources from 
which the overseas partner could profit from this joint venture, 
in addition to the distributed profit. Moreover, for an overseas 
partner, the establishment of an IJV also enhanced its business 
development in other areas in China. 
Second, the tighter control on transfer pricing and new product 
introduction from overseas partners has further increased 
the extent of their control over IJV profitability. While the 
parents share the profit 50/50 – as determined by the equity 
shareholding – the total amount of annual profit is significantly 
affected by the negotiation of transfer prices and product 
portfolio decisions. When the principles of setting transfer prices 
have been negotiated in the formation stage of an IJV and 
stated in the contract, the specific figures for each year vary 
depending on the items for transfer. 
Circumstances make negotiation a part of daily life in the IJVs:
•  less profitability-focus due to the number of profit sources 
with stronger control over IJV profitability for overseas 
partners
•  stronger desire for profit but a weaker position in profit 
control for local partners. 
Negotiation occurs at both executive and managerial levels, 
depending upon the significance of the item. 
Implications for investors and managers
The shared but split control style: model with 
flexibility and fitting well into dynamic environments 
Being successful in China has never been more important to 
multi-national enterprises because of the enormous size and 
the developing speed of Chinese markets. While this strong 
market provides more opportunities for overseas companies, 
it also awards local companies stronger bargaining power. 
Together with shifting objectives from learning to profitability 
and growth, we should not be surprised by local companies’ 
desire to be actively involved in the control of the entire range 
of activities within IJVs. Keeping the flexibility in control would 
enhance the cooperation between overseas and local parents, 
reduce the managing difficulty, and eventually bringing mutual 
benefits. The shared but split control style we identified from the 
case studies is an example of such flexible models. 
Be aware of the different roles that may be played by 
local government 
The interference of local government in China occurs at the 
formation and operation stages, and could bring benefit or 
challenge into IJVs. It is important for the invertors to be aware 
of the nature of the interference and be prepared to deal with it, 
either taking advantage or compromising. 5  |  Management controls in automotive international joint ventures involving Chinese parent companies
Prepare expatriates with negotiating skills
For the managers in an IJV, negotiation is a part of their daily 
life. Parent companies and managers should realise that 
negotiation exists not only at the formation stage and board 
level, but also at the operation stage and the executive and 
managerial levels. Preparing managers with good negotiating 
skills is important not just for the success of any IJV, and also for 
the well-being of those managers involved.
Conclusion 
The present study provided the first observation on evolutionary 
changes in the extent of controls exerted by parents in their IJVs. 
The factors promoting changes were identified as culture clash, 
rapid market changes and the roles played by local government. 
The influences of these multiple forces in the control process 
increase the difficulty in managing IJVs in China. Our study 
recognised the importance of keeping flexibility in managing 
IJVs in China and identified such a flexible model as a shared 
but split control style. Our research found that managers clearly 
have a role to play in the effectiveness of controls in IJVs. 
Management controls have not just been determined at the 
formation stage of an IJV, but also shaped by the negotiation 
and changing bargaining power during the operation. 
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